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COSROE CHAQUERI
DID THE SOVIETS PLAY A ROLE
IN FOUNDING THE TUDEH PARTY IN IRAN?*
VARIOUS THESES HAVE BEEN ADVANCED concerning the founding of the Tudeh Party
in fall 1941, after the forced abdication of Reza Shah in consequence of Irans
occupation by the Allies in late summer of the same year. There are those who, on
ideological grounds and without presenting any evidence, claim that the Tudeh was
a Soviet creation.1 The first known source that attributed the founding of the Tudeh
to Soviets, was the SAVAK historian, Col. Ali Zibai, who stated that (Rostam)
Aliev was present among the 27 founding members of the Tudeh in September
1. One of the folkloric theses regarding the establishment of the Tudeh Party is that during its
first founding meeting Rostam Aliev, later a Soviet Iranologist at Baku, was present. This
myth has been propagated by pro- and anti-Tudeh elements. Such a thoughtless thesis is
advanced by N. Kianouri, Tudehs last General-Secretary (1993: 73, 78  See the bibliography)
and S. Zabih (Communism, II, Encyclopaedia iranica, VI (New York: Columbia University,
1992); according to a confession in 1994 by Ahmad Ashraf, one of the editors of that
publication to this author while he was there too, this information was added by Ashraf with
Zabihs consent.) Among the repentant pro-Soviet supporters of this inept notion is the
interviewer and editor of the Memoirs of B. Alavi, H. Ahmadi (Spånga, Sweden, p. 257), who
quotes the repentant Stalinist Anvar Khamehis claim (Forsat-e bozorg-e az dastrafteh
(Tehran, 1984): 21) that Rostam Aliev of Soviet embassy was present at the founding
meeting of the Tudeh at Solayman Mirzas residence. Admittedly, Khamehi was still in prison
at that date and based his information on what he had heard from those present at the
founding meeting of the Tudeh (ibid.: 22). The said editor who claims to have verified this
thesis with two other (unnamed) members of the Fifty-three put the same question to
B. Alavi. The latter rejected this idea as a lie. Alavi added that it was not improbable that
R. Rousta etc. had been in touch with the Russians and had made S. M. Eskandari understand
that they had Russian support. As regards this folkloric thesis, it should be noted that Rostam
Aliev was born in 1930, and at the time of Tudehs founding was no older than eleven years old.
He entered Leningrad University in 1949. This author personally met Aliev in September 1993
in Baku. He died of a heart attack a couple of years later. A British report in 1943 suggested that
the Tudeh Party was founded either in late 1941 or early 1942. See Extracts from the
Review of the Foreign Press, 182 (16 April 1943), Foreign Office (FO), 371/35061. This
means that the British were not either aware of or concerned with the founding of a pro-soviet
organization at the beginning.
* The author wishes to express his most sincere thanks to the late Mary Dumont for her assis-
tance with the translation of Russian documents.
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1941. According to this source, most of those present did not know who Aliev was,
and those who did, kept quiet about his identity. Some of those present wanted to
call the party Communist, but Aliev opposed the idea as not suitable under the
present circumstances. At last his idea that the party be called Tudeh was
accepted.2 Others, on the other hand, mostly of Tudeh leadership, have claimed that
the Tudeh was created independently of Soviet wishes. Within this latter group,
there are those who have advanced the thesis that the Tudeh was Communist
from the very start.3 On the other hand, it has also been affirmed that the Tudeh was
not a Communist Party in the beginning but was gradually transformed into one.
Curiously, Iraj Eskandari, First-Secretary of the Tudeh during the Iranian
revolution of 1978-1979, defended both these theses, albeit at different times in his
lifetime.4 Given the limited space available in this article, it would be impossible to
list all these claims and sources; the interested reader is, therefore, referred to the
most important works among them.5 It is important, however, to refer to a work
published in the West that has now acquired the stature of authority on the history
of the Tudeh; it makes the following affirmation on the founding of that organization: 
In launching the organization, the founders [of the Tudeh] gave the party
chairmanship to Sulaiman Mirza Eskandari, the highly respected radical prince
who had fought in the Constitutional Revolution, helped establish the
Democratic party in the Second Majles,6 led the Committee of National
Resistance during World War I,7 and presided over the Socialist party from 1921
until its dissolution in 1926.8
2. Col. Ali Zibai (1964: 196 ff). This was a book published by a former SAVAK officer who
had previously taken part in the 1953 coup and helped the post-coup Military Governor of
Tehran, General Bakhtiar, to dismantle the opposition to the shah, particularly the Tudeh Party
Military Organization in 1954. The book is a descriptive melange of materials collected from
various sources, but unfortunately little from the Iranian archives. The books stated purpose is
to show how the Workers, Socialist, and Communist Movement in Iran was an alien body in
Iranian society and a tool of a foreign power. The colonel must have been assisted in his task by
former Communists as researchers and editors. According to the former Tudeh officer
F. Azarnour, Zibai, who lives in Colorado, has written his memoirs.
3. A publication of the Tudeh (Programme. Histoire (Paris, 1977), pt. I: 1) claims the party was
a continuateur (successor) of the Iranian Communist Party; the same claim is made by the
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and adviser of the Tudeh, N. N. Semenov (N.N. Semionoff,
Trente-cinquième anniversaire du Parti Toudeh dIran, ibid., pt. II: 1). The proletarian
nature of the Tudeh is also claimed by Gh.-H.
 
 
 
Foroutan (1911-1998), a leading Stalinist
member of the Tudeh CC who turned pro-Chinese in 1965; he denies even the suggestions by
such Tudeh leaders as N. Kianouri that the Soviets had proposed the founding of popular
party instead of a purely Communist organization. See Foroutans memoirs (1992-1993).
4. For his positions in this regard, see C. Chaqueri (1988: 104-105), and his works listed in the
bibliography.
5. For a number of contradictory claims, see the bibliography.
6. Historical evidence does not support this claim, although S. M. Eskandari replaced his
murdered brother as the parliamentary leader of the Democratic Party. See C. Chaqueri, 
 
The
Russo-Caucasian origins of Iranian social democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution,
1905-1911
 
 (forthcoming), chap. 6.
7. He belonged to the pro-German faction of the so-called National Government; see
C. Chaqueri (1998b).
8.  E. Abrahamian (1981: 281 ff.).
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The unique, albeit limited, chance of access to consult the Comintern archives in
1992 and 1993 has permitted this author to address this controversial question on
the basis of irrefutable documents, particularly in light of contradictory (seasonal)
narratives provided by the Tudeh Party itself. What follows is the account of the
founding of the Tudeh Party according to documents found in the archives of the
Comintern in Moscow. When necessary, occasional reference will be made to
published documents. Because of the controversial nature of the issue, long
quotations from the documents will be cited.
 
The role of the Soviet Army Intelligence in establishing
and shaping the Tudeh
 
In a report to his superior in the Red Army Intelligence Division,
 
9
 
 Brigade
Commissar Ilichev, Colonel Seliukov writes that according to your wish, he met
Solayman Mirza Eskandari, the veteran Democrat and Socialist. The meeting took
place on 29 September 1941 [7 Mehr 1320
 
10
 
], at 6 in the evening at his home.
 
11
 
 The
Soviet colonel was introduced to Eskandari by Soviet embassy counselor Petrov,
and they spoke for eighty minutes in Russian and Persian, through an interpreter.
 
12
 
After an exchange of customary courtesies, the Red Army Colonel Seliukov
asked Eskandari what his opinion was regarding the current events and the present
situation in Iran. His response was that nothing new had happened in that
country. We have had nothing similar to the events in Russia [in 1917] when there
was a revolution. Here the shah [
 
sic
 
, royalty] has remained in place. The Majles and
the government are, in fact, the same, and they  for the time being  introduce no
improvements for Iran. 
 
Political prisoners have not yet been liberated
 
.
 
13
 
 Solayman
Mirza added that Reza Shah went away under Russian pressure and the Red Army,
and it seems that he departed voluntarily [so that] his son [could] remain in his
place.
 
14
 
9. Col. Seliukov, Transcription of conversation with Solayman Mirza, dated 8 November
1941, Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI),
495/74/192 (hereafter: Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941); this report was
forwarded by Ilichev to the Comintern Secretary-General G. M. Dimitrov on 8 November
1941.
10. This is the official date of the founding of the Tudeh. Khamehi who refers to himself as
one of known Tudeh leaders between 1941 and 1948 (
 
Forsat
 
, 
 
op. cit.
 
: 10), but admittedly
joined the Tudeh only in August 1944 (
 
ibid
 
.: 113) refers both to 29 September and 2 October
1941 (7 and 10 Mehr 1941) as the founding date of the Tudeh (
 
ibid.
 
: 21, 44).
11. The Soviet colonel depicts the apartment as having several rooms, poorly furnished with
old furniture and cheap old carpets.
12. The conversation was translated by a certain Erkush.
13. Emphasis in the Russian original.
14. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941.
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Here Solayman Mirza obviously was patting his Soviet interlocutor, as the
historical fact is that Reza Shah had been forced to abdicate under joint Anglo-
Soviet pressure and
 
 did not depart voluntarily
 
, because of close relations he had
continued to maintain with Nazi Germany even after repeated British warnings that
German agents had to be expelled from Iran.
 
15
 
In this connection it is, indeed, noteworthy to mention here a significant piece of
information regarding the departure of Reza Shah under duress, which has thus far
remained untold. Initially, the British did not intend to force the old shah to
abdicate; the Soviets did. In a telegram, dated 17 September 1941, to the Quai
dOrsay, the French Minister at Tehran, Coiffard, reported that
The British, who had feared disturbances, would have preferred to keep the
shah on the throne. They had to abandon him upon Russian intransigence. They
were afraid of their increasing unpopularity by defending a sovereign already
discredited, accused in public rumors of having been their own creation. To
ensure themselves of the benefits of this gesture, they then took the initiative of
exiling him, and carried on, every night, on the English radio [BBC, Radio
Baghdad, and Radio Delhi], a most violent campaign in Persian [against him].
All the exactions of the shah were, for the first time, openly related and through a
voice [British radios] that could no longer be silenced. The considerable effects
of these programs on the Persian people did not escape the attention of the shah,
who last Sunday asked the British legation what is the aim of all this? Upon
[the receipt of] a British response, the shah, feeling that he had neither the
support of the occupying powers nor that of his people, decided to abdicate.
 
16
 
But because Iran was still nominally a sovereign country, the former shah could not
be expelled, unless an official warrant permitted the British authorities to arrest and
exile him. This unusual warrant was issued by his son and crown prince,
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who had now taken his place as the new shah of Iran.
 
17
 
 It
 
15. Regarding the pro-Nazi propaganda and positions by Reza Shah and his entourage, see
India Office Record/L/PS/12/3513 (London) and Archives des Affaires Étrangères (Paris)
(hereafter AAE), Asie, Iran, 1930-1940, Doss. 98.
16. AAE, Vichy, 1940-1944, Doss. 288. According to information received by the French from
the Turkish embassy, it was after the publication of an article in the official daily 
 
Ettelaat
 
(10 September 1941) regretting that the Iranian government was forced to close down the
German and Italian legations with which Iran entertained normal economic and political
relations, that the British reached the conclusion that the shah must go. See Coiffards Report
dated 22 September 1941, in AAE, 
 
ibid.
 
17. See the German biography of Mohammed Resa Pahlawi, Schah in Iran in Intern. Biog.
Archiv, dated 16 October 1941, Iran A2000, Zentrales Staatsarchiv (Potsdam). The German
biographical notes: Um mit allen Mitteln seinen Thron zu erhalten, unterschrieb er am
20 September 1941 sogar einen Arrestbefehl gegen seinen Vater. It is important to recall that,
while the Soviets at this time supported the idea of establishing a republic in Iran, the British
wished to return the Qajar dynasty to the throne. It was only after the meeting in London
between Sir Anthony Eden and the son of the last Qajar Crown Prince Mohammed Hasan
Mirza, the next Qajar prince in line for kingship, Prince Hamid, that the British decided in favor
of Mohammed Reza, because the Qajar candidate turned out to be illiterate in Persian.
Regarding the British initial attempt to restore the Qajars and the final decision to install
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as the new shah, see C. Chaqueri, Pishinha-ye Jomhouri 
 
Ketab-e
Jomehha
 
, 2-3 (1985); FO, 371/27205, /27212, /27184; and Eshraghi, Anglo-Soviet
occupation of Iran, 
 
Middle East Journal
 
, 1-3 (1984).
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was, therefore, after the issuance of this secret warrant by the crown prince,
apparently in exchange for the throne, that Reza Shah was escorted out of Iran by
the British forces. It is, however, true that, as S. M. Eskandari stated, the system had
remained intact.
Nevertheless, the shahs abdication and expulsion by the Anglo-Soviet forces
were favorably received by the Iranian political elite
 
18
 
 that had been deprived of
participation in public affairs, although there was still little hope for any change in
the political system. As Solayman Mirza Eskandari put it to the Soviet Army
officer: 
Previously, the shah simply named the Majles and the government, and it is
now the same situation. The new Majles [Thirteenth Legislature] and
government are composed of men appointed  ballots having been fabricated to
suit the young shah.
 
19
 
Solayman Mirza told his Soviet interlocutor that
we the free-thinking men can write nothing in the newspapers. Many people in
Tehran thought that, when the Red Army came, platforms would be erected and
they would speak freely about everything to the people, and that all the parasites
would be arrested. But this did not occur. The constabulary and the police have
remained and the government is ruling as in the past, so that many people have
lost hope and are afraid to work [politically].
 
20
 
In response, the Red Army colonel noted  obviously diplomatically  that
freedom and revolution are not exported and that the Iranian people can and must
introduce in their country the order and measures they desire. Encouraging
Eskandari personally, he added: You, M. Solayman Mirza, are an important
statesman and political activist of Iran and know better than anyone else what the
Iranian people want and what must be done to improve the situation in Iran, and it
would be very good if you acted. The presence of the Red Army here certainly
produces and will produce effects as regards the people of Iran and their leaders.
 
18. A view that is confirmed by the French legation at Tehran as well: Thus the population
welcomes his abdication with relief and without regret. See Coiffards Report dated
22 September 1941, in AAE, Vichy, 1940-1944, Doss. 288.
19. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941. British Minister Bullard reported
(19 September 1941, FO, 371/27219) that at this time there was a discussion for fresh elections
of the Thirteenth Majles which had begun under the [Reza] Shahs control and that [its]
members already returned (just a quorum) might be considered as the Shahs creature. But
Premier Foroughi and apparently Bullard believed that to dissolve [the] Majles would involve
departure from the Constitution and be an unfortunate precedent  a precedent that was
finally amended to the Constitution in 1949 after the new shahs first coup détat in
February1949.
20. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941.
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Then, Solayman Mirza mentioned that a certain X [H?
 
21
 
] had created a party
which already published its call to the people with the promise of improving the
situation. He further told the Soviet officer that,
Of course, we could also create such a party, but both the police and the
constabulary will prevent us from working, whereas no one harms them [the
other party], and they use the press freely. It is absolutely clear that we the free-
thinking people ourselves will not be able to do anything without your [Soviet]
help (he is applying to me). We need help. In general, the historical moment that
we now live, at the moment the Red Army is in Iran, must be used for the
improvement of the situation in Iran.
The Soviet Army officer replied that the situation then was most suitable for the
creation of the needed party and that help would be granted to him [Eskandari] in
his work if that were not contrary to our [Soviet] interests. In conclusion,
Solayman Mirza declared the following:
1) We will deal with the organization in order to obtain democratic liberties
and an easier life for the Iranian people; and
2) You [the Soviets] must grant us your assistance in this enterprise and help
obtain the liberation of, and the restoration of civil rights to, political
prisoners.
 
22
 
Colonel Seliukov also reported that he and Eskandari had agreed to meet the
following day (8 Mehr 1320/30 September 1941) at noon, while Solayman Mirza
would meditate a number of questions, and that he agreed to work with our help.
The second conversation took place at Eskandaris home at the arranged time
and lasted ninety minutes, continuing the previous days conversation. The Red
Army colonel warned Solayman Mirza that no one was to know of our yesterdays
conversation. To this the latter replied by an agreement. As an example, he stated
that [some] political prisoners had already applied to him, asking him to request
help from the Soviet embassy in the matter of their liberation;
 
23
 
 he had replied that
this is our (Iranian) business, and that the Soviet embassy cannot intervene in
it.
 
24
 
21. I have not been able to identify M. X (letter Kh in Russian, which could also be a
transliteration of Persian H), unless it refers to the Hamrahan Party created by Mostafa Fateh,
the Iranian economist, the highest ranking Iranian employee of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, who was later put into relations with the Tudeh and helped, within the framework of
Anglo-Soviet entente during the war, to obtain the license for the publication of 
 
Mardom
 
, the
Tudeh Party daily. Curiously, Hamrahan in Persian means Fellow-travelers!
22. The majority of them were Communists.
23. According to Khamehi (
 
Forsat
 
, 
 
op. cit.
 
: 24) the amnesty law concerning these prisoners
was adopted by the parliament on 16 October 1941.
24. It should be noted that as early as 18 September 1941, the Majles had, in private sessions,
discussed, 
 
inter
 
 
 
alia
 
, the liberation of innocent prisoners. See Bullard to FO, dated
18 September 1941, FO, 371/27219.
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Referring to Eskandaris remarks on the previous day regarding the real order
in Iran, the Soviet colonel then said that it would be well if you [Eskandari] could
explain on paper your reasons for dissatisfaction [with the situation] as well as your
program for [its] improvement. Eskandari was further told that, since on the same
day at four in the afternoon he was going to have a conversation with his supporters
with whom he intended to group in a party, he should state in writing the program
of your [proposed] party and what you are going to discuss at this meeting.
 
25
 
Solayman Mirza agreed to do all this, saying that until the creation of the party
his supporters would be called the party group. He then asked the Red Army
colonel for his opinion about the name of the group, to which the latter replied: for
the time being [and] in principle the appellation does not have much importance,
but we might revert to this question in the future. Then the Soviet officer stated
that, while he was sure of his [Solayman Mirzas] statesmanship and political
abilities, if his work is carried out in a suitable manner and corresponds to our
[Soviet] intentions, then it can be trusted that when there will be a change of
government, he [Eskandari] can hope to participate in it.
Solayman Mirza noted at this point that he could not participate in the
government of the time under Premier M.-A. Foroughi, because one could not hope
for any help from it. It would be a different matter if a new government were
formed, in which he would have his supporters enter [too]. When asked about his
financial situation, he said: I have a small income, no more than 250 
 
touman
 
s per
month. This is sufficient for me. In general, I do not think much about myself; the
main thing is the work. He gave the example that when the former Pahlavi Shah
wanted to give him a house as a present, or to sell it to him at a low price, he refused
it in favor of the Ministry of Education, of which he was in charge. It is clear here
that Eskandari rebuffed Soviet financial assistance to himself. He also frequently
said to his Soviet interlocutor that the people knew and respected him.
In the course of this second conversation, the Soviet army officer also learned
about the invitation extended to Eskandari to the Tenth anniversary of the October
Revolution in 1927, his meeting with Stalin and Chicherin then, as well as his past
connection with Caucasian revolutionaries some twenty years previously.
 
26
 
 The
 
25. Reportedly, the Soviets had also directly presented the Iranian government with a list of
expected reforms, including the transfer of Crown properties to the people, reduction of
taxation, with which the British and Premier Foroughi seemed to be in agreement; there were
other demands on the Soviet ambassadors list which aroused the anxiety of the Premier and
his Foreign Minister, namely, a moderate constitution giving the majority of the population
the right to elect [the] Majles and a minimum of local self-government. See Bullard to F.O.,
dated 19 September 1941, FO, 371/27219.
26. Solayman Mirza had been one of the few non-Communist Iranians invited to that event (see
C. Chaqueri (1998b)). Some of the others were the journalists Ali Dashti and Farrokhi Yazdi,
both of whose newspapers had been subsidized, along with Solayman Mirzas Socialist Party,
by the Soviets in the early 1920s. In June 1923 Soviet envoy in Iran Shumiatskii was reported to
have paid a number of pro-Soviet newspapers editors: Lesani for 
 
Kar
 
, 150 
 
touman
 
s; A. Dashti,
for 
 
Shafaq-e
 
 
 
Sorkh
 
, 160 
 
touman
 
s; and Mohammed Vosouq Homayouni, some 100 
 
toumans
 
 for
 
Paykar
 
; the Socialist Party of Solayman Mirza Eskandari received 2,000 
 
touman
 
s. (See
Intelligence Summary, 23 (19 June 1923); 31 (4 August 1923), in FO, 416/73.) Even as late
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Soviet officer politely asked him to write down his autobiography. At the end of
the conversation Col. Seliukov reminded Eskandari that he must write down the
following before their next meeting:
a) His attitude towards the prevailing conditions and government in Iran;
b) His views regarding the change of conditions that would satisfy the demands
of the Iranian people;
c) The program of his party and the questions discussed on 30 September during
the meeting of his supporters at his home;
d) His autobiography.
 
27
 
The next meeting with Solayman Mirza was to take place on 6 October (14 Mehr),
but they met with a five-day delay, on 11 October 1941 (19 Mehr 1320).
 
28
 
 At this
encounter, Eskandari informed the Soviet colonel that the program he had handed
to him through his associates had been sent to newspaper editors for publication,
but the press had refused to print it. His intention was to send it to all editorial staffs
in the country and if they refused to publish it [too], he would go to the speaker of
the Majles to ask him what kind of press freedom there existed in Iran when a
democratic party had no possibility to publish its program. He intended to ask him
permission to print the party program, as it was time to make public [the existence
of] our party, so that the Iranian people might know about it, so that all might know
about the existence of the national-democratic party of Iran and be acquainted with
its program.
Then asked by the Soviet officer whether this opinion was personal or shared by
the whole group, Eskandari responded that this was the opinion of the plenum and
presidium of our partyincidentally, not as yet called Tudehwhich, made up of
fifteen individuals, had been elected on 10 October 1941 (18 Mehr 1320
 
29
 
). When
questioned in what measure the Iranian people were supporting the party,
Eskandari stated that: I am sure that the Iranian people will come with us. We can
now count on 2,000 to 2,500 supporters in Tehran. The Red Army officer told
Eskandari that, having acquainted himself with his party program, he could tell him
that essentially, it is in accordance with our opinion and corresponds to the present
conditions in Iran.
 
30
 
 As to its publication and the legalization of the party, the
 
27. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941.
28. The delay may have been due to the Soviet anticipation that the party executive would be
elected on 10 October.
29. Khamehi (
 
Forsat
 
, 
 
op. cit.
 
: 22) says that the program was adopted on 29 September, not
10 October 1941.
30. The British embassy report on the first General Conference of the Tudeh Party (held at
Tehran from 1st to 12th August 1944) was that the moderation of the Tudeh program was
clearly dictated by the tactical needs of the party in its struggle for power rather than
ideological considerations. British Embassy Report dated 26 August 1944, FO, 371/40187.
as 1929 British ambassador Clive reported from Tehran to Henderson at the Foreign Office
(16 July 1929; FO, 316/85) that Taymourtash had, in response to his inquiry whether Iranian
Communists had any influence in relations with Moscow, stated that Solayman Mirza, though
living in Tehran and fairly harmless, no doubt still had communication with Moscow.
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officer added, he needed time to reflect upon them before expressing his opinion.
These questions were unexpected for him, since at the previous meeting they had
spoken of the necessity for you and future manifestations, to increase [your]
forces, to reinforce and educate the party, as well as to study the strengths and
weaknesses of the present government and the Majles. Clearly, the Soviets did not
wish to rock the boat of alliance with the British etc.
As if the Soviets had manifested dissatisfaction about some points of the
program, Solayman Mirza pointed out: We changed the points on our program
regarding the question of the police and the nationalization [of landed properties],
so as not to be accused of desiring disorder and sovietization. Regarding the police
it is changed as follows: All those who infringe on liberty will be punished by law.
And the point regarding the nationalization of land is approximately thus: Poor
peasants must be supplied with land. The program Seliukov transmitted to
Moscow did not contain the point on the police; it must have been dropped on
Soviet advice. Solayman Mirza added that some of my supporters think that I am
restraining them too much, but they are mistaken. I understand the present situation
quite well. As if he knew the Soviet popular front tactics, he symbolically added:
I have kept the portraits of Marx and Lenin, but it is not the time to put them out
even in this room. When the (suitable) time comes, they will be placed in my
room.
Then the Soviet officer informed Eskandari that he would give him his answers
in two days. This delay did not mean, however, that the Soviets forbade him to
act independently or he should limit his activity, which for the time being
coincides with our position. Solayman Mirza reminded the Red Army officer that
there were
some hot-blooded, impatient members [of the party] who demand immediate
manifestation of Communist and Soviet slogans. For instance, [Reza] Rousta
 
31
 
asks for immediate demonstrations and meetings. He openly says that the Soviet
embassy will support us, that we will be supported with money, and that in the
near future a new government of Iran will be formed comprising six supporters
of the USSR and six of Britain. Rousta presents himself as Communist and
clearly as a person sent by the Soviet embassy. His declarations introduce
conflict into our party, and I would ask you to help me preserve unity in our
party.
Regarding Reza Rousta, the Soviet Red Army officer replied that we [
 
sic
 
, you] are
a national party which must win over the majority of the people and then appoint its
representative in the government, and we [you] will be able to do this.
 
32
 
31. A Communist trained at the Communist University for Workers of the Orient
(Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudiashchikhsia Vostoka  KUTV), imprisoned under Reza
Shah, and later the leader of the Tudeh-led labor unions until 1949. He died in exile in the late
1960s.
32. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941.
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The following meeting between the Soviet officer Seliukov and S. M. Eskandari
took place on 15 October 1941 (23 Mehr 1320), lasting thirty minutes through an
interpreter. S. M. Eskandari informed his Soviet interlocutor that from the Majles
he had received the authorization for the publication of the partys program, of
which 1,000 copies would be printed. After its diffusion, he would endeavor to
obtain a permission to publish his own party organ. He did not elaborate on the
composition of the editorial staff of his party organ, but mentioned a number of
individuals who, in his opinion, would be able to edit the paper. He also intended to
obtain in the near future a place for his party club. Then the Soviet colonel was also
informed that Eskandari had made the acquaintance of the Qashqai tribal leader
Naser Khan, who resided in Abadeh in the vicinity of Shiraz. Solayman Mirza
wished to include him in the party as well.
 
33
 
The Soviet Army officer, Col. Seliukov, reported to his superiors that
I approved of his [Eskandaris] line of conduct concerning the publication of his
program and the legalization of the party, obtaining a press organ, as well as a club
for the party. At the same meeting, the Soviet officer drew Eskandaris attention to
the fact that at present his party has the task of bringing together all the democratic
forces and to struggle against all kinds of leftist attitudes inside the party, such as
those of Rousta. As to Rousta, no one in the [Soviet] embassy had authorized him to
establish connection with the party, much less advise such [radical] conditions.
Colonel Seliukov further advised Eskandari that if Solayman Mirza knows Rousta
well, [as] he had so stated, and is sure that he is not an adventurer, Eskandari
should try to persuade him of mistakes in his outlook and proposals. [For] it is not
advisable to push away [individuals with] leftist attitudes, but their mistaken
positions must be insistently explained to them.
 
34
 
As agreed previously, Eskandari and Seliukov next met in a weeks time, on
22 October 1941 (30 Mehr 1320) at 7.30 in the evening. The conversation, through
an interpreter named Ebrahim, lasted forty minutes. Solayman Mirza informed his
Soviet interlocutor that two days previously he had received a visit from a police
colonel who had warned him that he knew some people (that is, the party) were
gathering at Eskandaris place, and that because of the war situation such meetings
were prohibited. Eskandari added that today the military governor published a
declaration prohibiting gatherings, a declaration that was aimed at my party.
Eskandari further noted that they had had no time yet to print their program.
Although a permit had been received, no more than ten copies of it had been printed
before the police confiscated them. On the same day a congress of the party had
been held. Participants had gathered in a different place, not all arriving at the same
time, ostensibly due to police controls. They decided to print the program in the
 
33. It should be noted that the Qashqais, like Eskandari himself, had had pro-German leanings
and had collaborated with the Reich during World War I. See Chaqueri (1998b and 1995: 53,
86-87).
34. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941.
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Arak region (central Iran).
 
35
 
 In addition, Eskandari told his companions what
Rousta, who presented himself as the representative of the [Soviet] embassy,
[really] was. Eskandari further informed his Soviet interlocutor that he had
received, five days previously, an invitation from Mohammed Reza Shah to attend
at the Gulistan Palace the birthday celebration of the new shah. He had turned down
the invitation.
 
36
 
Regarding the government ban on meetings, Solayman Mirza intended to send a
protest to the premier and wished to know Col. Seliukovs opinion about it. The
Red Army officer responded that the situation had taken a wrong turn as regards
his party, but this did not mean that they had to deplore it. On the contrary,
work must be continued with even greater energy, increasing the number of
supporters. As to the protest letter to the premier, the Soviet officer remarked there
was nothing I could say for the time being as to the form in which it should be
done. In other words, he wanted, as on previous occasions, to obtain instructions
from his superiors about it.
 
37
 
 At this meeting the Soviet officer repeated his request
for Eskandaris autobiography.
The Soviet officer met S. M. Eskandari again on 11 November 1941 (20 Aban
1320), this time only for thirty minutes. Eskandari told his Red Army interlocutor
that at the last meeting of his party the question was raised as to the absolute
necessity of connection with the embassy of the USSR. Solayman Mirza added:
As they do not know about our connection, I did not tell them about it [either] and
declared that we must work on our own. Then, at the same meeting a question was
raised about the organization of groups in the regions occupied by the Red Army.
Eskandari told his Soviet connection: 

 
We want to send our representatives to such cities as Ahvaz, Tabriz, Pahlavi
 
[
 
Anzali
 
]
 
, Rasht, Gorgan, Mashhad, and other regions occupied by the Red Army
in order to organize, on a legal basis, sections of our party
 
.
 
38
 
 But I am afraid to
hamper your work in these regions. For this reason, I am seeking your advice in
this respect. I have already sent two individuals to Tabriz, and they are asking
[me] what to do. 
 
I have replied that they must wait
 
.
 
39
 
35. Apparently, the program of the Tudeh was first published in Arak, as 
 
Siasat
 
, the organ of
the organization stated on 24 July 1942 that the aims of the Tudeh Party of Arak were the
independence of Persia, struggle against reaction and dictatorship, and the strengthening of the
fundamental laws of the country. See Extracts from the Review of the Foreign Press, 182
(16 April 1943), FO, 371/35061.
36. This attitude was not to last for long, as Solayman Mirza finally met with the shah. For
instance, in late August 1943 the shah told the British diplomat that he had just had a
satisfactory talk with Solayman Mirza, and that he was about to see Qawam al-Saltaneh, who
had also expressed a wish to see him. See Minutes recorded by a British diplomat on
1 September 1943, in FO, 248/1427. 
37. Conversation with Solayman Mirza, 8 Nov. 1941
 
.
 
38. Emphasis in the Russian original.
39. Emphasis in the Russian original.
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Further, responding to the Seliukovs question, Eskandari remarked that in
southern Iran he has several men and that he intends to organize his groups there
too. Having had to check this latter point with his superior too, Col. Seliukov told
Solayman Mirza that this was a good idea and that I will be able to reply to this
question in a few days.
The Soviet officer concluded his conversation with Eskandari by insisting that
one of the main problems of Solayman Mirzas party is to increase the number of
his supporters and to educate Iranians in the democratic spirit. The officer also
reported that Eskandari could print and distribute no more than sixty to seventy
copies of his program.
 
40
 
In a subsequent conversation with Solayman Mirza Eskandari, held, as agreed
previously, in presence of Soviet interpreter Kommissarov, on 13 November 1941
(22 Aban 1320), the Iranian politician first informed the Soviet officer of the
following:
Two days previously [20 Aban 1320] Solayman Mirza had visited the Iranian
Premier, Foroughi,
 
41
 
 who had asked him his opinion about the new Majles and
its composition. Solayman Mirza had rejected this Majles as not new and no
elections had taken place. Agreeing to speak to each other, not as politicians, but
as friends, the Premier had alluded to Reza Shah, who had just abdicated, as
the cause of Irans misfortunes. Concurring with Foroughi, Eskandari had
asked him why not remove all the other causes, such as the practical ban on
free press. To this Premier Foroughi had replied: It is impossible to allow full
press freedom, for every [past or present] minister would want to publish a
newspaper, and they would be over two-hundred, and given the situation in Iran
under Allied occupation and with the presence of a German Fifth Column, the
publication of such newspapers might inadvertently harm us. 
Then in reply to Eskandaris demand for a newspaper, Premier Foroughi had said
that he will think it over and will be able to give a reply in thirty days, that is, if
I remain Prime Minister.
 
42
 
Further relating his conversation with Premier Foroughi on the type of
government Iran should have and the liberty of political parties in democratic
 
40. [Col. Seliukov,] Transcription of conversation with Solayman Mirza, sent on
8 December 1941 by Brigade Commissar Ilichev, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the
Red Army to the Comintern General-Secretary Com. Dimitrov, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
When forwarding the above report by Col. Seliukov to G. M. Dimitrov on 8 December 1941,
Brigade Commissar Ilichev asked him to inform him of the possibility of transferring to a
more competent person with regard to the work effected by him in Iran. (
 
ibid.
 
) This means that
a person with more experience in Iranian affairs was now needed to guide S. M. Eskandari
and his party.
41. Foroughi, a pro-British politician who had previously served Reza Shah, had fallen into
disfavor with him. He was invited to take over the reigns of power after the abdication of Reza
Shah.
42. According to Khamehi (
 
Forsat
 
, 
 
op. cit.
 
: 25, 36), the first issue of the Tudeh organ 
 
Siasat
 
was published on 22 February 1942 (3 Esfand 1320) and the anti-fascist daily 
 
Mardom
 
, on
31 January 1942 (11 Bahman 1320).
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countries, Eskandari noted that Foroughi had wanted him to present a 15-point
program within fifteen days and, if suitable, he would permit it to function. As
regards the law proscribing political party activities, Premier Foroughi had assured
Eskandari: Never mind, we will arrange this somehow.
Second, S. M. Eskandari said that he had received a letter from [A.-A.] Sartipza-
deh
 
43
 
 and [A.-Q.] Asadi
 
44
 
 (his supporters he had dispatched to Tabriz) that 
 
a party
had been organized in Azerbaijan, or was being organized, and Asadi did not know
what his attitude should be towards that party
 
. (See further below.) These two had
also asked Eskandari whom he would recommend to stand for the Majles election
from Tabriz. Solayman Mirza expressed the opinion that this party [in Azerbaijan]
must be a democratic one, but he was not so sure [it was]; he wanted his Soviet
interlocutor to tell him what kind of party it was and whether it was suitable for his
men to establish contact with it.
 
45
 
 Eskandari added that in general, in the northern
regions we must work in contact (
 
v kontakte
 
) [with the Soviets]; then that will be
more advantageous (
 
togda budet bolshe polzy
 
).
The Soviet officer then reported to his superior that I approved of his
[Eskandaris] visit to the Prime Minister and noted the necessity of closer relations
with the government and the Majles in order to study their strengths and
weaknesses, to inform me about these points, and to influence them  a line that
was in accord with the Anglo-Soviet war collaboration. Regarding the northern
regions under Red Army occupation, I recommended [to Eskandari] to abstain
from organizing his group there so long as I have not studied the question well.
With regard to the party that is being organized in Azerbaijan and [Eskandaris]
relations with it, I replied nothing and promised to deal with it in detail at the next
meeting, presumably after consultation with Moscow. Col. Seliukov concluded
his conversation by recommending to Solayman Mirza to increase his influence in
southern and western Iran, which were important British zones of influence and
rich in oil. At the end of this report to his superiors in the Intelligence Division of
the Soviet Army, Col. Seliukov made two recommendations:
1) Through the intermediary of Solayman Mirza it is possible 
 
to organize a
party
 
 [
 
as
 
]
 
 a single anti-fascist front
 
.
 
46
 
 Through this party we could have the
possibility of influencing very strongly the government and the Majles. [This
was, from the very outset, tantamount to a very conscious instrumentalization of
 
43. An old Social Democrat, said to have been a collaborator of the Iranian Communist Party
(ICP) in Tabriz in the 1920s. According to a report by the British consul (dated 9 July 1943, FO,
248/1149), Sartipzadeh was, on the eve of the elections for the 14th Majles, being supported by
the pro-German 
 
Sahand
 
 newspaper. This was unlikely; see further below.
44. A veteran Social Democrat and member of the ICP, who had been excluded from the ICP,
but remained pro-Soviet and whose daughter was sent to Iran from Moscow as a Comintern
agent in early 1942; see further below.
45. Apparently, this was a party organized by Baqerov, President the Azerbaijan SSR, with an
Azeri chauvinist bent, on the basis of which the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was created in
1945. See further below.
46. Emphasis in the Russian original.
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Tudeh by Soviet foreign policy.] The party would unite all the parties and
groups and would work under the leadership of Solayman Mirza.
Since the government wants to have [i.e., allow the existence of] a party, it is
possible to organize an anti-fascist party after having overcome certain
difficulties.
2) Distinct groups of Solayman Mirzas party in the regions occupied by the Red
Army should be submitted to the organization [in the Soviet Army?] of the
Central Committee of [the Communist party in Soviet] Azerbaijan.
 
47
 
Thus within six weeks, between 29 September and 13 November 1941, the Soviets
guided Solayman Mirza Eskandari and his associates to create an organization that
would not only respond to a desire of a part of Iranian society for political activity
on the center left, but also, and more importantly, to shape politically motivated
Iranians of the same tendency to establish an anti-fascist front that would serve
Soviets war needs on the political level in Iran and, eventually, their postwar
interests. The recommendations by Col. Seliukov to his superiors, the program of
the party group, which found approval in Dimitrovs letter to Stalin, V. M. Molotov,
L. P. Beria, and G. M. Malenkov (see below), and Stalins approval as formulated
in Dimitrovs instructions to its Iranian agents  Artashes Avanesian and Reza
Rousta  shaped not only the policies of the party group, which was to be
renamed the Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran before Dimitrovs letter was sent to Stalin on
9 December 1941 (18 Azar 1320), but also strongly influenced the destiny of the
Iranian left and Iranian national politics for the next four decades.
 
48
 
The role of other Soviet authorities in founding the Tudeh
 
In the meantime, an NKVD official called Fitin,
 
49
 
 wrote to Dimitrov on 5 November
1941 (14 Aban 1320) informing him of the developments concerning the formation
of the Tudeh (Popular)
 
50
 
 Party in Tehran. According to Fitins account, some
100 members and sympathizers of the Iranian Communist Party (ICP) had been
released from prison or exile. Six Communist activists had constituted a guiding
kernel to work under the cover of the so-called Popular Party of Solayman
Mirza. This kernel was composed of Artashes Avanesian, Reza Rousta, Iraj
47. Col. Seliukov, Transcription of conversation with Solayman Mirza, dated [?] December
1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
48. Although aware of the extent to which the Soviet authorities are interested in the fortunes
of the party (British Embassy Report dated 26 August 1944, FO, 371/40187), the British did
not seem to have the slightest inkling that the Soviets had actually created it. This is a clear
refutation of the pervasively held thesis in Iran that the British always knew what happened in
Iran.
49. According to information supplied to this author by an old historian of the CPSU archives
in Moscow Fitin had been an NKVD cadre.
50. This is the first time the name Tudeh is mentioned in the Soviet documents.
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Eskandari, Morteza Yazdi, Mohammed Bahrami, and Reza Radmanesh, a short
biographical notice of each of whom was sent by Fitin to Dimitrov.51
Fitin informed Dimitrov that the last five had entered the composition of the
15-member unofficial Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. The program of
the Tudeh was of bourgeois-democratic and anti-fascist content. The program of
the underground Communist Party at present was:
1  Verification of the composition of the [Tudeh] party, its purge of suspects,
provocateurs, and Trotskyists;
2  Reinforcement of its [Communist party] influence within the Popular party,
so as to carry out under its cover the tasks elaborated in its program;
3  Creation of party centers in localities, especially in Azerbaijan, organizers
having already been sent to Tabriz, Rezaiyeh [Urmia], Sarab, Rasht, and
Mashhad.
Fitin further informed Dimitrov that the activity of the new Communist leadership
proceeded slowly because its members had been disconnected from the life of the
country by imprisonment, and that for fear of repression, they were acting timidly,
as it was known that the police was watching the activists of the Communist Party.
Fitin also noted that, in order to infiltrate the new Communist group, particularly its
leadership, the British attempted, through their men and particularly the leader of
the Liberal Party, Mostafa Fateh,52 to establish contact with various Communist
activists, offering them material support, arranging employment for them etc.53
Fitin informed Dimitrov that our [NKVD] cadres in Iran had discussed the matter
with some leading Communists, given them certain advice resulting from the
prevailing conditions [in Iran], and granted them important material help.
Dimitrov was further advised that at the last session of the Provincial Bureau of the
Communist Party in Tehran, an application for membership in the Comintern
had been elaborated with the demand for instructions for further work. It was
asked to send the reply through our [NKVD] cadres. Artashes Avanesian had been
designated for contact with the Comintern.
Fitin also let Dimitrov know that side by side with a highly secret [conspiratorial
in Russian] relation of our cadres with the representatives of the Communist Party
51. The first two had been members of the ICP and confirmed Stalinists, who had been in Reza
Shahs prison in the 1930s; the last four had been arrested in 1937 and tried in 1938 as members
of the Communist group called the Fifty-three.
52. The party was called Hamrahan. Fateh had been educated in the US and was one of the rare
Iranian managers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was nationalized by Iranian
Premier Mosaddeq in 1951.
53. The two notoriously known cases are those of Bozorg Alavi, the Tudeh novelist (d. 1997,
Berlin), and Ehsan Tabari (d. 1989, Tehran), later its ideologue, who worked for Victory House
under the British embassy officer Miss Ann K. S. Lambton, but were later forced by the Soviets
to resign and work for the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society and the TASS agency, respectively.
The Comintern man in the Tudeh Party, Ardashir Avanesian, recalls in his unpublished
memoirs (1973-1975) his efforts to persuade the two mentioned above to abandon their work
in Victoria House and to work for the Russians in Tehran.
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and the Popular [Tudeh] Party, a contact is maintained with the latter through
uninvestigated and dubious individuals of polpred [embassy] and the military
attaché of the USSR in Iran, which might compromise the party in view of [their]
lack of [necessary] secretiveness in contact.54
While these discussions were taking place between various Soviet organs
themselves, Iranian Communist playwright A.-H. Noushin addressed a letter, in
mid-November 1941, through the Comintern General-Secretary G.M. Dimitrov, to
the Iranian Communist Morteza Alavi,55 transmitting the greetings of Iranian
prisoners, such as Bozorg Alavi and Mohammed Bahrami, to those [Iranian
comrades] in the USSR. This was obviously an attempt to encourage the return to
Iran of the Iranian Communists who had been resident in the Soviet Union since the
late 1920s and the early 1930s, unaware of what had happened to a large number of
them during the purges.
Once the question of the presence of Iranian Communists in the Soviet Union
was raised by Noushin, the Cadres Section of the Comintern provided information
on the following Iranian Communists who were still being held by the NKVD:
M. Akhundzadeh, Hasan Hasanov (Pourafar), A.-H. Hesabi (Dehzad), Kamran
(N. Aslani), Ladbon Esfandiari, Mir A.-Q. Asadi,56 K. Nikbin, and H. Rezaev
(Sharqi).57 The Director of the Cadres Section of the Comintern, Guliaev,58 noted in
his letter to Dimitrov that the majority of those to whom the greeting from Iranian
prisoners were addressed were being repressed by the organs of the NKVD.
Guliaev remarked that there was nothing astonishing about the greetings from the
Tehran prison, because B. Alavi or M. Bahrami cannot know what [had] happened
to their former party comrades.
Guliaev, Director of the Cadres Section of the Comintern, recommended to
Dimitrov that:
[It] would be desirable to put up to the NKVD leadership the question of
hastening the re-examination of cases of certain Iranians arrested in 1937 and
1938, and those of Kamran and Hesabi with priority, in whose personal records
54. Fitin to Dimitrov, dated 5 November 1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192. This last remark
about the Soviet military attaché apparently alluded to the complaint by S. M. Eskandari about
Rousta mentioned above. Fitins remark also reveals the multiplicity of Soviet contacts with
their supporters in Iran, on the one hand, and the rivalry between different Soviet organizations
in Iran, on the other.
55. The actual letter by Noushin was not in the relevant Comintern files consulted.
56. He was already back in Iran and working with Eskandari (see above); whether before the
occupation of Iran or thereafter, it is not known.
57. Most Iranian Communists had perished in the purges; a few such as the Communist poet
A.-Q. Lahouti, had been living in exceptional comfort in Moscow or in the Asiatic republics, no
doubt due to their collaboration with the Soviet secret police against their compatriots
persecuted by the NKVD. For a sympathetic view of Lahoutis life in Moscow, see E. Tabari
(1997: 119 ff).
58. Letter dated 21 November 1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
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there are many positive reports as to their work in the conditions of Iranian
underground.59
In connection with Noushins suggestions about sending members of the ICP from
the USSR to Iran or calling representatives of Iranian Communists to Ashkkabad
to discuss the question of the re-establishment of the ICP, the Comintern Cadres
Section considered it essential to hurry the departure of [other] comrades prepared
for work in Iran [see below], supplying them with appropriate instruction.
Independently of the departure of such groups, it would be useful to summon to
the ECCI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] comrades Reza
Rousta (Farhad) and Artashes Avanesian,60 or possibly both, to receive from them
detailed information regarding the situation in Iran, especially about the cadres of
the CP who are reassembling again after liberation from prison. Guliaev added
that according to the material in the Comintern archives,61 both Avanesian and
Rousta [had] behaved in prison as the most firm comrades,62 i.e., had been most
faithful to the Soviet line under Stalin.63 The Cadres Section also pointed out that it
was essential to inform Iranian Communists that their idea of joining the leadership
of the Tudeh Party of Solayman Mirza as a legal cover deserves approval.
Guliaev, recalling Solayman Mirza Eskandaris reputation among the radical,
democratic, and nationalist circles and his past struggle for democratic change in
Iran, further underlined that his party could become the center of attraction for all
progressive elements in Iranian society, thereby helping the Communists prepare
the basis for the mobilization of Iranian masses according to the platform of the
struggle against the threat of bloody Hitlerism and for friendship with the peoples
of the USSR, as well as that of a struggle for the democratic rights of the people of
Iran and the improvement of material conditions of workers.
As regards the problem of the Committee of the Iranian People, formed by
Iranian Communists recently released from prison, such as Avanesian and Rousta,
as well as the re-establishment of the ICP in the present complex situation in Iran,
and in such a case, in what organizational form, on 21 November 1941 Guliaev
still found it very hard to make a definite judgment. He, therefore, recommended
it as necessary to receive urgently the fullest possible information about the
59. Emphasis in the Russian original. It seems that the Communists mentioned on this list were
executed within a few months, understandably, because they could not have been returned to
Iran with the likelihood that they would turn Trotskyist or agent-provocateur of the British!
60. Emphasis in the original. This means that Avanesian or Rousta had not, by 21 November
1941, been in contact with the Comintern, but Rousta had been in relation with a member of
Soviet embassy staff, Bloshapkin, about whose lack of secretiveness Fitin reported on
5 November to Dimitrov (see above).
61. These files were not available to this researcher during the two research visits to the
RTsKhIDNI. It would be interesting to know who made these reports too.
62. Almost all accounts by Communists in Reza Shahs prisons relate the active defense of
these two of Stalins line against L. Trotsky and other rivals of Stalin.
63. This certainly means that the Soviet authorities had informers in prison other than
Communists who kept them abreast of the conduct of Communist prisoners.
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direction and forms of the movement that was developing under the new regime
[sic, shah] in Iran, the newly established parties and social groups, as well as their
influence among the Iranian masses. Furthermore, he found it: 
more useful under the present conditions to direct the energy of Iranian
Communists, not toward the re-establishment of the Communist Party, but
 primarily towards the creation and reinforcement of a wider popular party
with the participation and active role of Iranian Communists, acting within the
framework of this party, and with a single political line agreed upon with the
leadership of the ECCI. In such a case, Iranian Communists would act as a
Communist fraction in the framework of the Popular [Tudeh] Party, but they
would have to be covered by some other designation, corresponding to the legal
block of the left national elements.64
Recalling that under Reza Shah even the Iranian bourgeoisie had not enjoyed the
right to an organization of its own, and that the ICP, leading an underground
existence until 1936, was supported by no more than very limited strata of workers,
Guliaev recommended that Iranian Communists, working within the framework of
the Tudeh Party and reinforcing their position in it, must work, with redoubled
energy, at the establishment of labor unions and peasant organizations, thereby
laying the basis for the re-establishment of a strong, influential Communist Party.
The Cadres Section of the Comintern considered it as absolutely essential to
ensure the possibility of discussing these questions before the departure of the
Iranian group,65 namely four individuals it had designated to oversee or control
Communist activity in Iran (see below).
Cominterns instructions
Once the program took shape, on 9 December 1941 (18 Azar 1320)66 Dimitrov
informed Stalin, and his closest associates at the time (Molotov, Beria, and
Malenkov), asking no doubt for the Soviet leaders approval of the Comintern
united front program against the fully Communist initiative of such individuals as
Avanesian and Rousta. Because of its historical significance, this letter is quoted in
full:
The group of Iranian Communists, formerly political prisoners undertook the
re-establishment of the Iranian Communist Party. They created a provisional
bureau, appointed one comrade, Artashes Avanesian, for contact with the ECCI
and are applying to us [the Comintern] for instruction. They also sought our
agreement to send their delegate to us. According to the material of the Cadres
64. Emphasis in the Russian original.
65. Guliaev to Dimitrov, letter dated 21 November 1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
66. This was more than two months after the date officially declared on which the Tudeh is said
to have been founded.
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Section of the ECCI and on the basis of the information [provided by] NKVD
cadres, who are in contact with them locally [in Tehran], it can be considered
that these Iranian Communists are absolutely honest revolutionaries and pro-
Soviet individuals. At the same time, the Popular Party [Hezb-e Tudeh] has been
created in Iran by the militant democrat Solayman Mirza [Eskandari], with a
democratic program. For the last thirty years [Solayman] Mirza has been leading
the struggle for the democratic transformation in Iran. A group of Iranian
Communists are participating in this Popular Party.
Taking into consideration the special conditions in Iran (occupation together
with the British, demagogic and subversive activity by Hitlerites and their
agents, as well as the distrustful and hostile attitude of a part of Irans ruling
circles [towards the Soviets], we consider that the re-establishment of the
Iranian Communist Party, which always was a small sectarian group,67 will
hardly be useful at the present time and will certainly cause difficulties and
complications. This [initiative] will reinforce suspicion and dissatisfaction in the
ranks of Irans ruling circles, enabling German agents to frighten the Iranian
bourgeoisie with the possibility of sovietization of Iran, and the British
themselves will suspect the Soviet Union more of attempting, in their view, to
sovietize Iran.
For these reasons, Dimitrov went on, I consider that in the present circumstances
one should not recreate the Communist Party and [Iranian] Communists must work
within the Popular [Tudeh] Party along the following lines:
a  To struggle for the democratization of Iran; 
b  To defend the interests of workers;
c  To reinforce friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union;
d-  To eliminate completely the fascist agency in Iran and to abolish anti-
Soviet propaganda [there].
Together with this [agenda], Communists must work for the establishment of
professional [labor] unions and peasant organizations. I also consider it useless
for Iranian Communist to send a delegate to us [at the Comintern]. Instead, we
would dispatch our suitable comrades under an appropriate legal cover. He
could help Iranian comrades to carry out this line [of work]. Unless otherwise
instructed by you, I plan to advise Iranian comrades along this line.68
There is little doubt that the response by Stalin,69 or one of his close associates, was
positive, since only a week later Dimitrov addressed a letter to Artashes Avanesian,
instructing him how Iranian Communists should conduct themselves, exactly
according to his program submitted to Stalin and within the new circumstances:
67. The ICP was founded in 1920, and its leaders were, from the outset, always critical of
Soviet policy in Iran. Their critique cost the lives of the most knowledgeable and experienced
among them during the Stalinist purges. See C. Chaqueri (1992 and forthcoming).
68. Letter by G.M. Dimitrov To Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/
192.
69. Stalins response was not found in the Comintern archives, because, I was told, all his
correspondence is deposited in the Presidential Archives at the Kremlin, to which access by
historian has been denied thus far.
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The ECCI considers that in the present situation we should not re-establish the
Iranian Communist Party. Communists must work in the Popular Party of
Solayman Mirza [Eskandari]. Their task is to pursue a firm, sustained line in:
a)  struggling for the democratization of Iran; b) defending the interests of
Iranian workers; c) reinforcing friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet
Union; d) destroying completely the agency of fascism in Iran and frustrating
anti-Soviet propaganda. It must be endeavored to unite all the democratic and
progressive elements in Iran on the basis of this platform. Together with this
endeavor, Communists must work for the creation of labor unions and peasant
organizations to defend the daily interests and demands of workers and peasants.
At the present stage we must not display socialist and Soviet slogans; we
must not abandon the framework of democratic platform. It is necessary to carry
out propaganda, explanatory work in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, especially
among the young generation of Iran, but carefully and prudently. A few active
Communists, honest and fully scrutinized [filtered by the NKVD], entering into
the Popular [Tudeh] Party must be linked together  but not openly  so as to be
able to put into work the policy outlined above. It is absolutely essential to
establish the most friendly relations with Solayman Mirza. At present, I consider
it not useful for you to send a representative to the USSR. Such an arrival would
be made use of by [our] enemies and would harm your work. Keep us regularly
informed of the situation in Iran and of the activity of the Popular Party. Confirm
the receipt of this letter.70
Plan for a Communist united front in Iran
At the same time, the Comintern worked out a plan for assistance to Communist
activity not only in Iran, to the Tudeh Party as a united, anti-fascist front, but also
to other Communists in the neighboring lands. For the execution of this plan (which
is incomplete in the Comintern archives),71 a group of cadres were designated by
the ECCI to go to Iran; their tasks were:
1  Organization of lines of contact with the Communist parties of:
a. Arab countries (Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq);
b. India, according to one or two variants as follows:
i) through Basra or Iraqi territory; ii) through the Iranian ports of the Persian
Gulf; iii) through Afghanistan; iv) through British Baluchistan [now Pakistan].
c. Organization of direct relations with Iran (establishment of their own radio
transmitter) ;
d. Organizational and technical assistance to Iranian Communists for the
creation of mass organizations and then in the re-establishment of the Iranian
Communist Party.72
70. Letter by G.M. Dimitrov, dated 15 December 1941, to Artashes, Avanesian, RTsKhIDNI,
495/74/192.
71. The Comintern document being incomplete, it is certain that its more political details were
removed from the files, before the opening of the archives in the early 1990s.
72. Further parts of this report were not in the Comintern archives.
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The plan further stated that: In order to put into effect the tasks presented to the
group, its members will receive special schooling according to the division of
responsibilities between them. The group was composed of four individuals:
1) K., 2) A., 3) Sh., and 4) R. From among these, only two could be identified from
the documents available in the Comintern files: number 2 (A.), that is, Fath-Allah
Adelov73 and number 3 (Sh.), i.e., Zolaykha Sharif (Asadi).74 While the detailed
description of the tasks of numbers 1, 2, and 4 were not to be found in the open
Comintern archives, Z. Sharif Asadis were briefly mentioned: An Iranian national,
she was to go first to Iran. In possession of Iranian passport, she was to leave
towards the end of 1941 through the Turkmeno-Iranian frontier, with the legend
that she had completed her medical studies in the Soviet Union, with two years of
practical training in hospitals and now was returning to her country. In Tehran she
would open a private hospital [clinic]. This enterprise would be financed partly
by the funds she would take with her and partly by what her father would provide
her with in Tehran. It was added: In reality, we must give her the fund for the
organization of the hospital.
The anti-fascist program
The study of the said program and its related instructions would help understand the
Soviet united front tactics during the anti-fascist war. On 8 November 1941 Col.
Seliukov, Chief of the Second Section of the Third Department of Intelligence of
the Red Army, enclosed S. M. Eskandaris anti-fascist party program to the records
of conversations he had held with the latter and sent them to his superiors and the
Comintern. The program is as follows:
Introduction: 
At a time when national independence around the world finds itself threatened
by the dictatorial regime and despotism, and when the liberty of individual[s],
73. Born in 1902 in the Iranian district of Samarkand, Adelov was an experienced Communist
cadre. He had been trained at the KUTV and Workers Faculty (Rabfak), knowing Persian,
Uzbek, Tajik, Azeri Turkish, and Russian. He had been a worker, an employee, a teacher, and
an educational director in Samarkand, as well as an agitprop director, and a party official in
Tajikistan. He had never been sanctioned by the All-Russian CP; he had been awarded by the
Tajik SSR for his work; he was described by Guliaev as having valuable qualities: modest,
contemplative, prudent, and a good observer of underground rules. He could perform his duties
in Iran after undergoing special training. Guliaev report, dated 2 December 1941,
RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
74. Born in 1916 in Tehran, she was the daughter of veteran Social Democrat and Communist
Asadi and CC member, who had been excluded from the ICP in 1930, but who had remained
pro-Soviet, nevertheless. She had pursued medical studies in the USSR, become a physician,
and had been member of the Komsomol between 1933 and 1937. She had been excluded from
that organization in 1937 because she had been allowed to join it in 1933 in violation of
organizational rules. She had worked for Soviet medical institutions for two years. She was
described by Guliaev as too trustful of people, for which reason she had to undergo special
schooling before being sent to her assignment in Iran as a transmission link. She knew
Persian, Russian, and some German. See Guliaev report on her and her father, dated
2 December 1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
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won in the course of centuries at the cost of bloody revolutionary struggle, is
being destroyed by dictators and enslavers, when international reaction stamps
out and destroys all national liberties, the Iranian people, who were, for the last
twenty years, in the clutches of despotism and tyranny, having had to bear the
greatest evil and misfortunes, have once more tasted the happiness of freedom.
In order to acquire true freedom and the full destruction of the remnants of
the past tyranny and violence, on the one hand, and to deny reaction and
despotism the possibility of taking advantage of the situation so as to enslave
once more the Iranian people for its own criminal interests, an Iranian group is
organized in Tehran. It represents all free Iranians and the working class. It calls
upon all the freedom-loving, democratic, and enslaved Iranians to unite around
it [the group] so as to obtain the satisfaction of their just demands, to establish a
democratic regime, and to declare the downfall of reaction and despotism.
The main objective of the group: 
1) Preserving the independence and integrity of Iran.
2) Establishing a democratic regime and granting of all personal and social
rights to man, such as the freedom of expression (oral and written), of opinion,
and of assembly.
3) Combating all kinds of dictatorial and despotic regimes.
4) [Carrying out] the necessary reforms with the objective of making use of
land. Organization of [a] normal way of life for peasants and workers in Iran.
5)  Reforming education and health preservation as well as introducing
generalized, compulsory, and free education; providing the popular masses with
the benefits of culture and health preservation.
6) Establishing just taxation, taking into consideration the interests of popular
masses.
7) Reforming the economy and trade, developing the industry, the mines of
useful subterranean products, as well as the transport system, such as building
and the preservation of a vast network of roads and the improvement of the
railroads.
8) Confiscating, in favor of the Iranian people, the properties of the former shah
and his supporters who acquired them through criminal and tyrannical abuse of
their power.75
All the preceding is confirmed by the founders of the party group and will be
in force until the party conference is organized. In order to put into effect the
above, and taking into consideration the present situation in Iran, the party group
sets itself the following tasks:
1) To organize new elections for the Majles; to ensure the election of true
representatives of the people and the freedom of elections; and to eliminate all
kinds of intrigues.
2) To put an end to the arbitrariness of those in power and to destroy the police
state.
3) To raise the standard of living of the popular masses and to modify
employment laws so that salaries ensure the vital minimum for civil servants.
4) To struggle in a determined manner against pilferage of state property,
bribery, and all kinds of illegal use of position in [government] service.
75. The content of this program, not the exact wording, is provided by Khamehi (Forsat,
op. cit.: 23); he does not indicate his source. A similar version of the fundamental principles
of the Tudeh and its first program is given by the Zibai SAVAKs handbook (1964: 199 ff.).
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5) To compensate morally and materially those who under the former shah were
subjected to persecution and tyranny. To demand the re-transfer of lands
belonging to petty landowners and peasants from whom they had been taken by
force.
6) To prosecute according to law and punish the people who harmed the country
and freedom, as well as those who oppressed and suppressed the personal and
social rights of man.
7) To provide social security for the people and to facilitate their moral and
material life. Special attention must be paid to the creation of larger quantities
and cheaper prices of food products. The most intense struggle must be waged
against speculation and price increases.
8) To ensure the independence of judges and the real separation of the executive
and judicial branches of the state.
9) To abolish all loans and forced orders that existed under the former shah and
were meant to harm the popular masses.
10) To change the laws and regulations of military service in the interest of
popular masses and to stop the application of violence and disorder in this
domain.76
New encounters between Soviet officials and S. M. Eskandari
In a second meeting77 between S. M. Eskandari and the Soviet official A. A. Kuznetsov
in late February 1942,78 the former informed the latter of the imminent arrival of
Seyyed Zia Tabatabai, the notorious pro-British politician who had jointly carried
out the 1921 coup with Colonel Reza Khan,79 and who had been exiled by the latter
on account of personal rivalry. Along with a number of other right-wing politicians
supporting the firm-hand policy, such as M. Tadayyon and General Ahmadi,
Seyyed Zia was a candidate for premiership. Further, discussing the growing
audacity of the pro-Nazi group distributing handbills of Long Live Iran and
Germany, Eskandari lamented that in the absence of a mass party the reactionaries
will easily reestablish the military dictatorship.
As regards the progress of the Tudeh, he added that cells had been organized in
Arak, Isfahan, Rasht, Tabriz, Kashan, and some other localities.80 In Tabriz cell
members had gone up to 2,500. With regard to the question, put to him by his
76. Sent by Col. Seliukov, on 8 November 1941, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
77. The report of the first meeting with Kuznetsov was not in the Comintern files.
78. The date of the meeting is not mentioned on the document; on the other hand, it is remarked
that one copy of the report of conversation was printed on 21 February1942.
79. For an extensive history of this pro-British coup détat, see C. Chaqueri (1995: chap. 14).
80. According to a British report, by the time the first provincial conference of the party was
held on 9 October 1942, the Tudeh had at least provincial committees in Arak, Rasht, Qazvin,
and in Azerbaijan. See Extracts from the Review of the Foreign Press, 182 (16 April 1943),
FO, 371/35061.
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representative Sartipzadeh, of the attachment of Azerbaijan,81 from the linguistic
viewpoint, to the USSR or Turkey, Eskandari said that he had replied that now was
not the time to raise this question. It was necessary to uphold the integrity of Iran,
because the language was not the most important point; it is required to improve the
conditions of the peoples living standard and to hold the party in readiness in case
of necessity to prevent an attempt to restore the military dictatorship.82
S. M. Eskandari went on to state that his second task was the establishment of a
newspaper which he considered essential to publish as the organ of the Popular
[Tudeh] Party, adding that he [had] decided to act openly and decisively, otherwise
we would be lost as a party. Having received a verbal authorization for the
publication of the newspaper, Eskandari thought that even if he managed to publish
it, he feared, it would be rapidly closed down as in the second issue he would
[certainly] publish the program of the Popular Party.
Come what may, he was determined to act firmly: We must make ourselves
known, otherwise we will be strangled one by one. Then he proceeded to tell his
Soviet interlocutor that I am awaiting your advice and help. Statements alone of
non-intervention in [Irans] internal affairs can have regrettable consequences, as
happened twenty years ago,83 that is when the dictatorship of Reza Khan was
installed with British support.
Degradation of the economic situation in 1942 and the Tudeh success
In a report by the Soviet Naval Intelligence Directorate,84 Captain Vorontsov
provided very interesting accounts of the situation in Iran during the year 1942: the
severe deterioration of economic conditions in Iran; population of entire provinces
starving; people dying in the streets in consequence of the scarcity of bread; cities
filled with beggars arriving from starved villages; 3,000 people in Rasht took part
in pilferage of rice stores; people were killed and injured; fascist propaganda
arousing anti-Soviet and anti-British feelings in the people; the situation in Iran
produced different [political] currents in the government circles and among
certain influential people. One of the small groups principally working for their
own interests and endeavoring to reinforce their influence on the government
81. Sartipzadeh had put the question to Eskandari because of his differences with pro-Baqerov
elements in Tabriz who wanted to enter the Tudeh organization, raising the question of
autonomy, the Azeri language, etc., a line that Sartipzadeh strongly opposed. The embryo of
the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan formed in 1945, this issue, which calls for a
separate analysis, is discussed in two letters in Persian by Asadi to Rousta. RTsKhIDNI, 495/
90/218. 
82. Transcription of conversation, between S. M. Eskandari and A.A. Kuznetsov,
21 February 1942, sent by Lt.-Col. Kalashnikov, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/192.
83. Ibid. 
84. Main Naval Staff of the Marine Fleet, dated 25 September 1942, Moscow, RTsKhIDNI,
495/74/195.
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through gaining the support of the people by demagogic manifestations was the
Tudeh Party which acted legally. The leaders of this party have a secret
(conspiratorial in Russian) center. The party published the newspapers Surat in
Rasht, Siasat and Mardom in Tehran; and the main objective of the party was to
improve the situation of the workers of Iran.
Tudehs first self-image
A report that seems to be an account of Tudehs founding and a first annual
summary of its activities, sent to the Comintern most probably by Artashes
Avanesian, the contact man with the ECCI, notes that the party was organized at the
end of 1941, its initiators having been Communists released from prison on the
basis of the amnesty granted on the occasion of the accession to the throne of the
new shah. Unaware of the secret six-week long discussions between Solayman
Mirza and Col. Seliukov, the report further states:
After [their] release from Tehran prisons, there formed a group by Communists
and intellectuals sympathizing with them, who had been condemned to prison
terms along with the Communists, i.e., Abol-Qasem Asadi, Iraj Eskandari,
Dr [Morteza] Yazdi, and Reza Rousta. It was decided to create an illegal
provisional bureau of the Communist Party, composed of Reza Rousta, Iraj
Eskandari, Dr Yazdi, Dr [Reza] Radmanesh, and Dr [Mohammed] Bahrami, all
of them [except Rousta] were members of the famous group of the Fifty-three.
The bureau decided to establish links with the ECCI. It appointed Artashes
Avanesian, who still was in [internal] exile, for this purpose.85
The bureau undertook the struggle for the liberation of all Communists, particularly
of those condemned in connection with the case of the Fifty-three. With this task
in view, all means were used, including pressure on ministers and parliamentary
deputies. Three to four illegal cells were created in Tehran, composed of some
twenty men. It was decided to develop all activities on the basis of organizational
principles of the Communist Party.
Unaware of Seliukov-Eskandari secret talks, the author of the annual report
notes that the creation of the Tudeh as an anti-fascist party was the idea of the
Communist group, which negotiated it successfully with Solayman Mirza, and that
a special commission composed of Communists and democrats elaborated the
party program. Subsequently, an organizational assembly of the party was
planned, which chose a provisional Central Committee86 of fifteen members. Of
85. Popular Party and the work of Iranian Communists, incomplete text, undated, but no
doubt written in late December 1942. See RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/195.
86. Khamehi (Forsat, op. cit.: 28-29) provides a different version of these developments and
attributes the founding of the Communist group within the Tudeh to A. Avanesian. He also
states that, after the death of S. M. Eskandari, R. Rousta  not A. Avanesian  became the
official contact with the Soviets, not the Comintern, which is informally the same thing  a
claim which does not tally with Dimitrovs report at the time.
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the list of the fifteen CC members the author provides,87 except for the first four, the
rest had been members of either the ICP or the Fifty-three.
The report also remarks that when the police threatened Tudeh CC members
with banishment from Tehran, the intellectuals among them were somewhat
afraid. Thus the CC attempted to obtain the support of the Soviet embassy, with
which it entered into contact through Bloshapkin, previously known to Reza
Rousta. At the same time, the CC sought to win the support of popular masses. The
majority of CC members were sent to the provinces, and their trips were crowned
with success. Organizations of the Tudeh Party were started everywhere. Yet
the report adds that the party was not yet numerically large. Towards September
1942, it counted only 2,087 registered members, of whom 1,137 were in Tehran
and 950 in the provinces.88 With over 50 % working class membership, this only
mass party in the country obliged the government to take it into consideration.89
This incomplete (mutilated) report ends with the comment that the weak aspect
of the Tudeh was the non-involvement of the peasantry in the party work.
Another report sent, ostensibly on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the
Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, from Tehran on 7 November 1942, by
A. Avanesian, informs the Comintern of the composition of the Tudeh CC, with
which the author does not seem to have agreed, as I did not take part in selecting
the existing CC members because I was in prison at Bandar Abbas. Avanesian
recommends to the Comintern to study the separate report he had made to the
Communist International on the characteristics of the Tudeh CC members  a
report that was not to be found in the archives. He also tells the Comintern that upon
his release and arrival in Tehran I said that this CC is not wholly suited and is not able
to lead the mass movement. [...] I also pointed out that the program of the Tudeh
Party is incomplete and promises nothing concrete to the workers and peasants.90
Along with the second report on Tudehs first year of existence, the Comintern
archives contain a message greetings from Artashes Avanesian to Stalin and the
Soviet CC, dated 7 November 1942, the 25th anniversary of the October revolution.
Sent to the Great Leader and Friend, the message conveys the sentiments of the
Communist group within the Tudeh. It indicates that for its author and his
companions in struggle there is no greater honor than the leadership of the bold
battle of the Soviet people against the black armies of reaction and imperialism.
Certain that victory will be Stalins in this sacred war, Avanesian stated that
workers of the whole world contemplate with admiration the heroic battle of the
87.  S. M. Eskandari, Abbas Mirza Eskandari, Ali-Asghar Sartipzadeh, A.-H. Noushin, A.-H.
Shafii, Mousavi, B. Alavi, Mir Javad Javadzadeh Pishevari, A.-Q. Asadi, Reza Rousta,
M. Bahrami, I. Eskandari, R. Radmanesh, and M. Yazdi; Khamehi (Forsat, op. cit.: 22) also
provides a different list of the Central Committee.
88. This does not tally with the number given by S. M. Eskandari of over 2,000 in Tabriz alone.
89. Popular Party and the work of Iranian Communists, RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/195.
90. Report by A. Avanesian to the executive of the Comintern, dated 7 November 1942,
RTsKhIDNI, 495/74/195; this report was accompanied by a message sent to Dimitrov on the
occasion of the 25th aniversary of the October revolution.
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people of the USSR, the glorious defense of steel fortresses [note the pun with the
meaning of Stalin in Russian!91] of Leningrad, Moscow, Sebastopol, and especially
Leningrad, realizing that the Soviet people are indebted to your [Stalins] wise
leadership for these victories. Preserving the great legacy of Lenin against the
attempts of filthy fascist bands, Stalin was leading the Soviet Union to victory in
this war, the most horrible in the history of mankind.
Idolization of Stalin went even further for the Tudeh leader: 
To you befell the greatest honor, to guide the struggle of the proletariat at the
period of underground [work], at the time of the revolution, and finally the
construction of the first socialist state. Today, after twenty-five years of work
and victories on the socialist front, we send you, the great leader and friend,
[our] warm, revolutionary greetings.
In conclusion, Avanesian expresses the hope that for many long years, you will,
together with the steel party of Lenin, [continue to] lead the immense armies of
workers in the battle for the final liberation of humanity from the yoke of capital.
Long live the All-Russian Communist Party! Long live the heroic Red Army! Long
live the peoples of the USSR.92
Conclusion
The evidence we have examined above clearly demonstrates that the Tudeh was a
creation of the Soviet state, through the agency of its Red Army, thus demolishing
the thesis that this organization was a genuine party established independently by
the progressive elements who had been released from Reza Shahs jails on the
morrow of Irans occupation by the Allies. On the other hand, while there is some
congruence between the Aliev thesis and what we have documented in this
study, it is important to put an end to the myth disseminated by the SAVAK, which,
precisely because it is a myth, would cut both ways, particularly when used by
some Communist repentants whose repetition of the myth is denounced along with
their repentance by the faithful. In the same breath it must be added, however, that
the Tudeh, though established through the agency of the Soviet Army, reflected and
yet masterfully used, a genuine desire by a number of political prisoners who had
wished to lead a progressive political party that would play an important, if not
decisive, role in the destiny of their country. The documentation we have perused
above also demonstrates that the Soviets instrumentalized the Tudeh from the very
outset for their own national interest. From the examination of the very first contact
with S. M. Eskandari down to the detailed approval of its program by not only the
91. It is widely known in Tudeh history that Avanesians nom de guerre was Poulad, i.e.,
Steel (Stalin).
92. Signed Artashes [Avanesian] on behalf of Aktiv, dated 7 November 1942, RTsKhIDNI,
495/74/195. The group Aktiv is not known; it must have been the same as the Communist
kernel within the Tudeh Party.
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Comintern under Dimitrov, but also Stalin and his closest advisers, we can clearly
see that Tudeh was to be guided by the Soviets in the direction that served their
interest. The manner of founding of the Tudeh foretold its expansion, policies in
Irans national politics, and final destiny.
It is thus not surprising that, in spite of the countrys great suffering under Reza
Shahs dictatorship for nearly twenty years, the strength of the Tudeh remained
very limited in its first year of existence (fall 1941 to fall 1942), as Hitlers army
moved deep into Soviet territory, but began to increase after the Soviet victory over
the Reichswehr at Stalingrad in January 1943.93 No less interesting is the fact that
the Soviets, in spite of a clear request put to them by the Communist playwright
Noushin and others, refused to return to Iran, and later executed, some Iranian
Communists who had survived the great purges and still lived in NKVD detention
camps. Apparently, this was due to the fear the Soviets had that a group of
sectarian Communists  as Dimitrov put it to Stalin  of the dissolved ICP would
carry out policies that would isolate them in Iranian society during a crucial period.
But the real reason must be sought elsewhere, i.e., in the two decades of
independent line the ICP had attempted to carry out in spite of Soviet guidance. It is
clear that, in view of their alliance with the Western powers in a life-and-death
struggle against a ferocious enemy such as Hitler, the Soviets could hardly afford,
at a decisive moment, to bring onto Irans sensitive political field Communists who
had been critical of past Soviet policies in Iran. Still less could they afford to turn
loose and promote such Communist leaders for the post-war period, as long-term
Soviet interests would be threatened by the presence of critical Communists who
had, in addition, tasted the fruit of the really existing Communist paradise.
The naiveté of those young Tudeh leaders who had been collaborators or
students of Dr Taqi Arani94 and had been arrested and jailed with him in 1937, on
93. Although Semenovs figure of a Tudeh membership of 25,000 at its first congress in 1944 is
exaggerated (N. N. Semionoff, art. cit.: 2), it nevertheless witnessed a rapid inflation of several
fold within a year after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The membership of the party seems to
have grown very rapidly after the end of the war itself, for according to one delegate to the
Tudeh first congress held in summer 1944, 80 % of its membership was made of veteran
workers of the cause and only 20 % of new recruits. British Embassy Report dated 26 August
1944, FO, 371/40187.
94. Arani (1902-1940) had been educated in Berlin, where he had been introduced to Marxism
and had been acquainted with such German Communist leaders as Will Münzenberg, returned
to Iran in 1929 and founded in 1934 the independent Marxist review Donya. He was contacted
by a Comintern agent in 1935 and his secret intellectual circle was drawn into the new ICP
that was being formed by the Comintern after the dissolution of the ICP. The new group was
then discovered by the police upon the arrest of two other Comintern agents who confessed to
the existence of a new Communist group with Arani at its head. Arani and the others were tried
and condemned to various terms of prison. Only Arani died in prison, reportedly under terrible
conditions imposed upon him. For a study of Aranis life and activities, see C. Chaqueri, ed.
(1969-1994: Introduction. vols 14 and 15); id., The tragedy of Iranian dissident Communists,
1926-1938 (forthcoming). Assertions or suggestions according to which Arani was the
founder of the Tudeh Party are obviously false, since Arani died in prison on 3 February 1940
and the Tudeh was founded in December 1941, nearly two years later; see, for instance, J. Droz,
ed., Histoire générale du socialisme, 3: De 1919 à 1945 (Paris: PUF, 1977): 635-638 which
implies that Arani founded the Tudeh.
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the one hand, and their ignorance of ICP history and the Soviet experience partially
due to the prevalence of political repression in Iran, on the other, prevented them
from seeing the light of reality and the trap they were falling into in the hope of
realizing their ideal of saving Iran from the morass of colonial capitalism and
indigenous dictatorship. It is for this reason that when the Tudeh leaders faced their
challenge during the Soviet demand for an oil concession in Iran (the Kaftradze
mission of fall 1944),95 they bungled up completely and seriously risked their
increasing popularity, particularly because on that issue they opposed the patrio-
democratic leader Mohammed Mosaddeq, not the Iranian reaction. On the occasion
of the founding of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish autonomous governments (1945-
1946), too, they made grave mistakes and were identified in the eyes of the public at
large with Soviet expansionism in Iran.96 Their anti-democratic treatment of their
dissidents, leading to the 1948 split, did not improve their public image either.97
Although officially proscribed in February 1949 under the pretext of participating
in a so-called attempt on the life of the shah,98 the Tudeh remained strong until the
advent of the oil nationalization movement. The biggest challenge the Tudeh faced
was when it opposed Irans national-democratic movement under Mosaddeq for the
nationalization of Iranian petroleum industry, which had been in the hands of the
British since the beginning of the century. The Tudehs ferocious opposition to
Mosaddeq and labeling him as an American stooge  no doubt a line recommended
by its Soviet mentor  cost the party an enormous price, identifying it increasingly
with Soviet interests in Iran. The Tudeh has since been blamed by most Iranians,
including a good number of former Tudeh intellectuals, of having largely
contributed to the success of the Anglo-American coup détat in 1953.99 Contrary to
what has been generally claimed, the Tudeh, its military organization included, was
not vanquished by the CIA-supported Military Government issued form the 1953
coup détat, but by the doctrinal and programmatic crisis its leading cadres and
members went through during the partys opposition to Mosaddeq, depriving them
of the necessary confidence in a leadership that partly lived lethargically in
Moscow exile and partly in underground at home.100 The SAVAK only swept the
95. For an account of this Soviet demand, see the debate in the 14th Majles (1944-1946),
including Dr M. Mosaddeqs intervention, in H. Kay Ostovan, ed., Siasat-e movazeneh-ye
manfi, 2 vols (Tehran, 1948 ), I: 156-234.
96. On this issue, see L. LEstrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War, The Azerbaijan crisis of
1946 (Cambridge, 1992); see also its review by this author: MESA Bulletin, 1 (July 1993).
97. On the 1948 split, see J. Al-e Ahmad, Dar khedmat va khianat-e roshanfekran (Tehran,
1997) : 420 ff.
98. The Pahlavi regimes claim that in 1949 there was an attempt on the life of the shah  after
which the Tudeh was banned, repression was reinforced, and the Constitution was appended
under anti-democratic conditions to increase the autocratic power of the shah  has never been
questioned. In a detailed study of this issue I have, on the bases of irrefutable archival
documents, demonstrated that the attempt was fake and stage-managed by the royal court in
order to re-establish Reza Shahs autocracy. See C. Chaqueri, The Shahs first coup détat,
1949 (forthcoming).
99. See B. Amirkhosrowi (1996).
100. See C. Chaqueri, ed. (1978-1981).
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broken pieces of an organization already shattered from the inside by Mosaddeqs
patriotic and democratic challenge. The revival of the party leadership in 1957
under Khrushchev and the self-criticism made at the Fourth party plenum101 in the
same year did not improve the image of the party at home and among its former
cadres, nor the new split in 1964 provoked even by its pro-Chinese wing. The
Tudehs role in the struggle against the guerrilla groups at home in the 1970s; the
partys timid approval of the royal reforms in the same decade under the new
General-Secretary Iraj Eskandari, while the Soviet relations with Tehran were
steadily improving; the sudden removal of Eskandari and the appointment of
N. Kianouri, in January 1979, on the eve of the revolution;102 support for
Khomeinis line under Kianouri;103 and the unconditional support the party
leadership always gave to the Soviet state and party, all appeared to be, not without
reason, a reflection of Tudehs total subservience to Soviet interests in Iran.
Paradoxically, the life of the Tudeh Party came to an end when the remnants of
elements who still hanged on to democratic ideals were forced to split from it after
the death of Iraj Eskandari on the eve of May Day 1985, not with the demise of the
Soviet state.
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